The Security Perceptions of Turkish Society towards Syrian Refugees[*]

Türk Toplumunun Suriyeli Sığınmacılara Yönelik Güvenlik Algısı

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Abstract

Natural causes such as unbalanced distribution of resources and climate change, which may be coupled with man-made causes such as armed conflict, occupation, discrimination, violation of human rights, developed technologies, and the demand for a better life, have made the human race experience migration. With the contribution of international actors, the civil war in Syria after the Arab Spring in the Middle East, which began in early 2011, displaced Syrians internally and internationally. The mass migration of over 3.5 million Syrians, who were distributed across every city of Turkey, has affected Turkish society in many areas such as social, economic, political, and security from a broader perspective. The main goal of the research is to identify the Turkish security perception caused by the Syrians who have been living in Turkey for over ten years, in the light of ongoing discussions about their permanent or temporary status. Security perceptions are selected and measured with a newly developed questionnaire. The "Most Similar System Design", which is frequently used in social sciences and allows to make comparisons, has been used to measure these perceptions. Two cities, which have similar socio-economic parameters but different populations of Syrians, have been chosen as suitable for this design. A high level of security perception in total and variances were found in both cities.

Keywords: Migration, Security, Security Perception, Syrians, Syrian Asylees.

Öz

Doğal kaynakların dengesiz dağılımı ve iklim değişikliği gibi doğal nedenler, silahlı çatışmalar, işgaller, ayrımcılık, insan hakları ihlalleri, teknolojik gelişmeler, daha iyi bir yaşam talebi ve arzusu gibi insan kaynaklı nedenlerle birleştiğinde insanoğlu zorunlu,

düzenli ve düzensiz göçe maruz kalmıştır. Arap Baharı sonrası uluslararası aktörlerin de etkisiyle Suriye'de oluşan iç savaş, Suriye Vatandaşlarının 2011 yılı başlarından itibaren Orta Doğu'da ederek iç ve dış göçüne sebep olmuştur. Türkiye'nin her şehrine dağılmış 3,5 milyonu aşkın Suriyelinin kitlesel göçü, Türk toplumunu sosyal, ekonomik, siyasi ve güvenlik olmak üzere birçok alanda geniş bir perspektiften etkilemiştir. Bu araştırmanın temel amacı, Türkiye'de on yılı aşkın süredir kalan Suriyelilerin kalıcı veya geçici statüleri konusunda süregelen tartışmalar ışığında Türk Vatandaşları üzerinde neden olduğu güvenlik algısını tespit etmektir. Suriyelilere yönelik güvenlik algısı konuya özel yeni geliştirilen bir anket ile ölçülmüştür. Bu ölçüm için sosyal bilimlerde sıklıkla kullanılan ve karşılaştırma yapılmasına olanak sağlayan "Benzer Sistemler Tasarımı" kullanılmıştır. Benzer sosyo-ekonomik parametrelere sahip ancak farklı Suriyeli nüfuslarına sahip iki şehir bu tasarıma uygun olarak seçilmiştir. Seçilen her iki şehirde toplamda yüksek düzeyde güvenlik algısı tespit edilirken aynı zamanda şehirler arasında da farklılıklar bulunmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Göç, Güvenlik, Güvenlik Algısı, Suriyeliler, Suriyeli Sığınmacılar.*

Introduction

The early stages of world history witnessed universal human mobility due to the lack or unbalanced distribution of natural resources and climate conditions. Lately, in addition to natural causes armed conflicts, displacement due to occupation, discrimination, human rights violations, developed technologies and their awareness, demand for a better life and the desire to achieve liberties have uprooted whole populations and forced them to migrate. Historically, Anatolia has always been a point of transit, destination and source of these movements. Since it lies between two continents with abundant natural resources, four seasons, temperate climate and amicable nature of inhabitants, many civilisations have benefited from Anatolia.

The latest mass migration to the Turkish Republic came from Syria. The chaotic Syrian crisis beginning with the demonstrations known as the Arab Spring on March 15, 2011, led the country into an undeniable civil war in April of the same year. Their lives went into suspension as civil spilt across all of Syria and Syrians were at risk, could not obtain their basic needs and security, thus they had to leave their country.[1]

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[1] Ayşe Şebnem Tunç, "Mülteci Davranışı ve Toplumsal Etkileri: Türkiye'deki Suriyelilere

The first movement of the mass population from Syria began on April 29, 2011, and exceeded 3.5 million in the first quarter of 2020. While a small portion (%2) of Syrians, live in temporary shelter centers, the balance is scattered across every city in Turkey.[2]

Having so many Syrians in every city of Turkey, affected and continues to affect Turkish citizens in many areas, such as social, economic, political, security etc. The open-door policy that accepted Syrians was implemented with humanitarian feelings, has also allowed people of other persecution of Assad since 2013 and 2014, and those who were displaced due to other upheavals and threats.[3,4,5] These uncontrolled movements created the illusion of a security weakness. Bomb, mortar and suicide bomb attacks that occurred in İstanbul, Ankara, Gaziantep, Kayseri, Kilis, Diyarbakır, Ağrı, Van (cities of Turkey) in the last six years, caused citizens to believe they were carried out by those taken into the country registered or unregistered. The increase in ordinary crimes such as theft, pickpocketing and begging, persuaded society that these crimes originate from Syrians.[6,7] Related to the real statistics, the government has a very meticulous policy about keeping the crime rate of Syrians secret. But open sources show Syrians involved in around 700 crime cases.[8]

In order to explain the issue of migration and security through the paradigm of change in Turkey and to examine the perceptions of security and

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İlişkin Bir Değerlendirme", *Tesam Akademi Dergisi*, Temmuz 2015, 2 (2). 29-63, p. 30.
[2] Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) Temporary Protection Statistics, https://en.goc.gov.tr/temporary-protection27, (Accessed: 30 April 2020).
[3] BBC News Turkish, "Grafiklerle: Suriye'de 8'inci Yılına Giren Savaş", https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-43414137, (Accessed: 15 April 2020).
[4] Gamze Güngörmüş Kona, "Orta Doğu Merkezli Radikal Örgütler ve Türkiye'ye Etkileri", *Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi*, 2011, V. 1, 789-805, p. 801-804.
[5] Mehmet Zeki Ak, Mustafa Dindar, Nurullah Altıntaş, "Türkiye'de Terörizm ile İktisadî Büyüme İlişkisinin Nedensellik Analizi", *Bilgi*, Yaz 2017, 20-31, p. 23.
[6] ORSAM Rapor, "Suriyeli Sığınmacıların Türkiye'ye Etkileri", No: 195, Ankara, Ocak 2015.
[7] Hakan Ömer Tunca, (2019). Türkiye'deki Suriyeli Sığınmacıların Toplumun Güvenlik Algısına Etkisi: Gaziantep ve Balıkesir Örnekleri. Doktora Tezi. İnönü Üniversitesi.
[8] Geçici Koruma Altındaki Suriyelilerin Suç İstatistikleri, https://21yyte.org/tr/merkezler/islevsel-arastirma-merkezleri/gecici-koruma-altindaki-suriyelilerin-suc-istatistikleri, (Accessed: 26 February 2022).

identity with the data obtained from the field, doctoral[9] and master theses[10] have been made to analyze the current situation. Other sources include official/unofficial statistics, reports, assessments and books[11] by UNHCR, IOM, UNICEF, EU, MoFA, MoI, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Institute of Strategic Thinking, national/international governmental/NGOs. Most of the doctoral and master thesis presented legal aspects of migration in Turkey or around the world, refugee, and asylum related concepts and historical approaches, policies, integration and cyclical development-oriented solutions. Written materials discussed economic, health and sociological effects of Syrian migrants based on the limited information received from the field and are well known, however, the effects of Syrian refugees on the security perception of the society have not been studied in detail with information from the field. There exist a limited number of researches executed in Istanbul covering security with only "Increase of crimes such as battering, murder and rape", "terror" and "neighbourhood security" pillars finding a low degree of concern regarding the existence of Syrians.[12] The main purpose of this article is to determine the security perception issue rising from the effects of Syrian Refugees on society. Security concerns cover all areas of life. A more comprehensive perspective looks at threats, which

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[9] (1) 21.Yüzyılda Türkiye'nin Tehdit Algılamaları ve Güvenlik Açılımları (Nihat Akçay, 2008, Uludağ Üni.), (2) Türkiye'nin Yoğun Göç Alan Bölgelerinde Meydana Gelen Sorunların Güvenlik Bağlamında Analizi; Tuzla, Şifa Mahallesi Örneği (Kemal Olçar, 2013, Harp Akademileri Stratejik Araştırmalar Enstitüsü), (3) Türk Toplumunda Suriyeli Çocuklar Algısı: Fatih ve Esenler Örneği (Ersin Doyran, 2017, Marmara Üni.)

[10] (1) Sosyal Kimlik ve Temel Kişilik Özellikleri Bakımından Türkiye'deki Toplumsal Güvenlik Algıları (Duygu Dinçer, 2009, Harp Akademileri Stratejik Araştırmalar Enstitüsü), (2) Yeni Güvenlik Algılaması Kapsamında Küresel Isınma (Ayça Eminoğlu, 2009, Karadeniz Teknik Üni.), (3) Kütlesel Göçlerin Ülkelerin Güvenlik İhtiyacı Üzerine Etkisi (Yasin Özcabı, 2007, İstanbul Ticaret Üni.), (4) Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorilerinde Güvenlik Kavramı (Hakan Kıyıcı, 2012, Akdeniz Üni.), (5) Güvenlik Sektörleri Yaklaşımı ile Suriye'den Türkiye'ye Yönelen Zorunlu Göçün Analizi (Gülin Merve Ayaz, 2016, Kara Harp Okulu), (6) Gaziantep'teki Suriyeli Sığınmacılar Üzerinde Güvenlik Politikası ve Neoliberalizm Eleştirisi (Zeynep Beşlioğlu, 2016, Hacettepe Üni.)

[11] (1) Türkiye'deki Suriyeliler: Toplumsal Kabul ve Uyum (1. Baskı). İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları (Murat Erdoğan, 2015, İstanbul), (2) Syrian Barometer, Murat Erdoğan, 2014, 2017, 2019 (Supported by UNHCR)

[12] TUSES Rapor, "İstanbul'da Suriyeli Sığınmacılara Yönelik Algı ve Tutumlar: Partizanlık, Yabancı Karşıtlığı, Tehdit Algıları ve Sosyal Temas", https://tr.boell.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/Istanbulda%20Suriyeliler%20Raporu%20BASIM.pdf, İstanbul, 2021.

emerge from environmental, economic and social fields beyond military and political fields. A wider field emerges that covers deeper issues that span individual/personal security versus global security, immigration, transnational crime, epidemics, environmental pollution, depletion of local and national resources, overpopulation, economic imbalance, and many other issues. This article moves the issue of migration to the axis of security to fill the gap in research and shed light on why the economic, health and social effects of the Syrian influx are so strong on Turkish society. The aim of this paper was achieved with the development, application (November-December 2018), and analysis of the Societal Security Perception Scale pertaining to Turkish citizens.

1. Literature Review

The causes of immigration change constantly under the conditions of the time in human history. Inter-tribal conflicts, civil wars, occupations, disruption of the nation-state structure, change of borders, discrimination in religion and ethnic structures, change of political systems, violations of human rights, epidemics, increasing population, disproportionate distribution of our planet's natural resources, coupled with climate change, deadly winter weather, drought, famine, the misapplication of technology are some of the causes. Because of these reasons, people concerned with ab insecure future, feel forced to migrate from their ancestral homelands to other lands and nations with different socio-cultural characteristics. Recent history suggests these movements have become more widespread, diversified and can be characterized as increasing rather than decreasing. There are four sources of migration from undeveloped and developing to developed countries where their poverty and political irregularity present challenges to existing economic, political, social and cultural institutions.[13]

As the 20th century ended and especially since the 21st century began, the downward economic aspect of migration started to outweigh the benefits of legal immigration. The 17th and 18th centuries saw the first mass economical migration of slaves to meet the labor need of the

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[13] Ahmet İçduygu, Şule Toktaş, "How Do Smuggling and Trafficking Operate via Regular Border Crossings in the Middle East? Evidence Fieldwork in Turkey", *International Migration*, 2002, 40 (6), 27-54, p. 27.

Americas in agriculture. In the early 19th and 20th centuries when the industrial revolution was experienced in Europe, similarly, qualified people came to this region to complete the labor force.[14] In recent years, Venezuela's situation, the poverty of Africa, and the mobility of people after the economic and political collapse of the USSR modern-day have become examples of these economy-based migrations. Pre-World War II emigration of Jews fleeing Hitler's oppressive and racist regime, the emigration of those fleeing the internal conflict of Syria, emigration after the regime change in Iran, emigration after Yugoslavia's post-war dispersal, mass migration after World War I and resulting country border changes in Europe, Asia and Africa, migration after the occupation of Afghanistan by USSR and the implementation of the Taliban Regime may be considered as examples of politically-driven migration.

Over 12 million people from 1914-1950 from Eastern Europe to West Germany, 1.3 million people during 1992-1995 from Bosnia and Herzegovina to nearby countries, 300,000 people in 1993-1994 from Burundi to Tanzania, 250,000 people in 1994 from Rwanda to Tanzania and 3.9 million people from 2011 to the present from Syria to neighboring countries have faced with the refugee/asylee crisis within their continents.[15] Because of the net migrations in the world, developed regions have gained population since 1950, while developing regions have been steadily losing population. Between 1950 and 2010, net migration increased steadily, increasing to an average of 3.2 million per year between 2000-2010; an average of 2.2 million per year from 2010 to 2015.[16]

Excess migration and the frequency of migration, political and social inclinations of immigrants may affect the policies of the states. In this context, the relationship between migration and security is explained as follows:[17]

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[14] Esin Yılmaz Başçeri, *Uluslararası Göç, Uluslararası Politikada Yeni Alanlar-Bakışlar*, Der Yayınları, İstanbul, 1998, p. 494.
[15] UN, "International Migration Report, 2015", NY.
[16] UN, "International Migration Report, 2017", NY, p. 13.
[17] İbrahim Erdoğan, "Küreselleşme Olgusu Bağlamında Yeni Güvenlik Algısı", *Akademik Bakış*, Yaz 2013, Cilt 6 (12). 265-292, p. 282.

- Immigration limits the ability of some countries to fulfil some of their state-related functions because of immigrants pushing the limits of traditional sovereignty and autonomy in various fields,
- Lines of National identity become blurred, therefore societal security by changing the demographic structure of the target country,
- Immigration can be used as a tool to influence other states or achieve foreign national policy objectives.

Some states believe immigration influences security through terrorism. They believe measures taken against terrorism are eroded through immigration (realism paradigm) and went to the alienating policy. On the other hand, some have linked the issue with the approach to access to citizenship, economy and social rights.[18]

During the Cold War, the world made nuclear and traditional conflict areas a security issue per the bipolar power balance. After the Cold War, immigration and terrorism compete as issues that are not fully qualified as war such as human rights violations, socio-economic injustice, unemployment, and internal conflicts arising from religion. In the same period, the understanding of security has become more dominant, leading to the exemption of the humanitarian state of immigration, the restriction of the most fundamental rights and freedoms, the exposure of individual smugglers or traffickers and sending them out of the country.[19]

Global security goes beyond personal or military and political areas: Migration, due to the changing environment and consequent effects in economic and social spheres, has the transnational measures of crime (such as terrorism, mafia, organized crimes, human-valued substance-biological substance trafficking and money laundering).[20] The need for security phenomenon may have started due to threat perceptions. Threats can be

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[18] David Newman, "Population as Security: The Arab Isreali Struggle for Demographic Hegemony", Poku N., Graham, D. T. (Ed.), *Redefining Security Population Movements and National Security*, Preager Publishers, London. 1998, p. 163-186.

[19] Şebnem Koşer Akçapar, "Uuslararası Göç Alanında Güvenlik Algılamaları ve Göçün İnsani Boyutu", Ihlamur-Öner, S., Öner, N. Ş. (Ed.), *Küreselleşme Çağında Göç: Kavramlar, Tartışmalar*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2012, p. 563-565.

[20] Beril Dedeoğlu, *Uluslararası Güvenlik ve Strateji*, Derin Yayınları, İstanbul, 2003.

assessed across a broad spectrum, ranging between perceptions and real events. Under this concept, threats can be classified into three groups:[21]

In the first group, international terrorism, organized crime organizations, cyber terrorism, the states aiming to attack, the spread of conventional and mass destruction weapons as national physical threats, in the second group, threats to the national or global economy or financial markets, (individual, societal or national) welfare or environment and health aggression, immigration and refugee movements as damaging national interests; in the third group, the attacks on universal democratic values, human rights and freedoms as threats towards common values. According to these threat perceptions today's perception of security has transformed into the understanding of societal security. The main reason for the transition to societal security, which includes identity and culture, is ethnic conflicts, especially in Europe after the Cold War. One of the threats to societal security is migration.[22]

In Migration, people of X are invaded by people of Y, or are losing their characteristics because of those people; The X community will not exist as before, because others will form the population. The identity of X differs due to the change in the structure of the population (such as the migration of the Chinese to Tibet and the Russian to Latvia). Since immigration and immigrants are seen as a thing that complicates the natural flow of life, it is itself a threat category. As it complicates the lives of individuals, it also affects the way society lives together. Therefore, migration is considered an issue of societal security.[23] The concepts of securitization and social security belonging to the Copenhagen School have an important place in the explanation of migration in recent years. According to the Copenhagen School, security problems do not pose a threat by themselves but are securitized by the actors. In the framework of

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[21] Erdoğan, "Küreselleşme Olgusu Bağlamında Yeni Güvenlik Algısı", p. 277.
[22] (1) Ole Waever, *Securitization and Desecuritization*, Columbia Uni. Press, NY, 1995, p. 65, (2) Ole Waever, "Toplumsal Güvenliğin Değişen Gündemi", *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi*, 2008 Cilt 5, (18), p. 154-159, (3) Selim Kurt, "Toplumsal Güvenliğin Yükselişi", *The Journal of Academic Social Scie. Studies*, (2015), Fall 1 (37), p. 469.
[23] Jef Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear in Migration and Asylum in the EU*, Reutledge Publish, NY, 2006, p. 45-46.

securitization theory, security is conceptualized as an intersubjective phenomenon by using the social constructivist approach, and since it is interpreted as a security problem, it becomes a security problem.[24, 25]

The pioneers of the School explain securitization as the politicization and securitization of an issue that has not been politicized, that is, not in the interest of the state, by making it a part of public policy by the state. In this context, if we take the phenomenon of migration as an example, a politician's statements that immigrants pose a threat to the social order, culture and economy do not mean a determination about the situation, but rather the transfer of the existence of immigrants from the non-political field to the political field and then to the security field. Especially in Europe, the security relationship of immigration, which is felt in high doses with the direct connection from unemployment to crime rates and terrorism, is the picture of securitized immigration. Copenhagen School's securitization is an easy way for the politicians incentive by using nationalist sentiments. Not accepting refugees but ok with specifically economic migrants that are in need.

The Syrian Arab Republic, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Somalia, Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic, Myanmar, Eritrea and Burundi, are 10 countries where UNHCR operations at the end of 2016, have seen at least 13.5 million refugees (79% of the world) source for the last five years.[26]

For years, Turkey has been a transit country, which experienced the largest population movements and relocation because of its strategic position on the migration route. During Ottoman Empire times, Turkey was the objective for Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian and Middle Eastern countries with ethnic Turkish populations, in addition to being a source country for asylum seekers in Europe in terms of population.[27]

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[24] Ole Waever, Securitization and Desecuritization, p. 47-50.
[25] Barry Buzan & others, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., London, 1998, p. 4.
[26] IOM, "World Migration Report 2018", Geneva, 2018, p. 2.
[27] Selim Han Yeniacun, "Suriyeli Sığınmacılar Raporu, İstanbul Örneği", *Fikir ve Eğitim Derneği*, İstanbul. 2014, p. 1.

Turkey's migration history can be defined in three stages: first was the Ottoman Empire's last period and the rise of the Republic of Turkey and her nation-state setup process. The second was the migration which marked the historic Turkish Diaspora (the so-called 'guest worker' irony of the North-West European labor immigration) with differing types of immigration from Turkey, and the third is the growth since the emigration of the 1990's that accessed asylum or immigrant status.[28]

The Republic of Turkey received 1.7 million Turks, Bosnians, Albanians, Circassians, Pomaks and Tatars from the Balkans, Caucasus and Crimean regions and Peshmerga, Iraqi-Kuwait Citizens, Kurds, Turkmen, Arab and Chaldean which the Ottomans reached their largest land during the reign of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent.[29,30] Turkey hosted over 1.6 million migrants between 1923-1997. Most of them were of Turkish origin (kin) and gained Turkish citizenship.[31] From her foundation till 2011, Turkey received a total of approximately 2 million immigrants.[32]

On March 15, 2011, after the Arab Spring, the political situation in Syria turned into civil war and caused massive internal displacement and external migration. The first mass population movement towards Turkey from Syria, Hatay, the district of Yayladağı, Cilvegözü border gate on April 29, 2011, began with the acquisition of 252 Syrian citizens from the border.[33]

According to the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM), 14,237 were numbered at the end of 2011, 224,655 at the end of 2012, 1,519,286 at the end of 2013, 2,503,549 at the end of 2014, 2,834,441

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[28] Gökçe Bayındır Goularas, Ulaş Sunata," Türk Dış Politikasında Göç ve Mülteci Rejimi", *Hacettepe Üniversitesi İletişim Fakültesi Kültürel Çalışmalar Dergisi*, 2015, 2 (1), 12-40, p. 16-21.
[29] Nihan Ciğerci, "Bursa-Kırcaali Hattı: 1989'da Gelen Bulgaristan Göçmenleri Örneği", Ihlamur-Öner, S., Öner, N. Ş. (Ed.), *Küreselleşme Çağında Göç: Kavramlar, Tartışmalar*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2012, p. 107.
[30] Ahmet İçduygu, "Land of Diverse Migrations, Challanges of Emigration and Immigration in Turkey", Bilgi University Press, Istanbul. 2004, 88-109, p. 88-99.
[31] Kemal Kirişçi, "Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 2000, Vol. 36, (3), p. 1-22.
[32] Murat Erdoğan, "Türkiye'deki Suriyeliler: Toplumsal Kabul ve Uyum" (1. Baskı), Bilgi Üniversitesi Yay., İstanbul, 2015.
[33] Murat Erdoğan & Ayhan Kaya, (eds) (2015) "Türkiye'nin Göç Tarihi: 14. Yüzyıldan 21. Yüzyıla Türkiye'de Göçler," İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, p. 5.

at the end of 2015, 3,426,786 at the end of 2017, 3,623,192 at the end of 2018, 3,576,370 at the end of 2019, and as of April 17, 2020, 3,583,584 Syrians were taken under temporary protection to Turkish Republic (Table 1).[34] Considering the migration of a total of 1.8 million, figures in the history of Turkish Republic from 1920 until 2012 show that the amount of migration taken place in the last 6 years is almost twice as before.[35]

Table 1. Syrian Population in Turkey

In some Turkish cities, the Syrian population is high, but the ratio of Syrians to Turkish citizens living in that city is low. In other cities, however, the number of Syrians is low, but the ratio of Syrians to Turkish citizens living in that city is high, so the higher ratio cities were affected much more than high numbered cities. For example, hosting 496,635 Syrians with a 15,067,724 Turkish population, İstanbul's ratio becomes 3.30% while remaining below 4.37% which is the average of Syrians in Turkey. The cities (Table 2) are the ones affected by Syrians at high rates according to this ratio calculation: Adana (11.08%), Gaziantep (22.18%),

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[34] Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) Temporary Protection Statistics, https://en.goc.gov.tr/temporary-protection27, (Accessed: 30 April 2020).
[35] Erdoğan and Kaya, "Türkiye'nin Göç Tarihi", p. 8.

Hatay (27.08%), Kahramanmaraş (8.06 %), Kilis (77.62 %), Mardin (10.64%), Mersin (11.63%), Osmaniye (09.27%), and Şanlıurfa (20.78%).[36]

Table 2. Syrian Population by Cities

Initially, Syrians were placed in camps, the number reached almost 255,000 people in 25 temporary shelter centers in 10 cities in the first quarter of 2015. Currently, 63,518 (1.77%) Syrians live in seven temporary shelter centers in five cities, while the remaining 3,520,066 (98.23%) are distributed in each city of Turkey.[37] Gradually, Syrians began assimilating into their new locations and communicating with Turkish citizens.

By looking at their age status (Table 3), Syrians in Turkey can be described as a young population: 500,950 Syrians are of pre-school age, 924,033 Syrians are of Turkish compulsory education age (5-14), 255,231 Syrians are after school age (15-18) and 1,828,843 Syrians are working age (19-65). One can deduce from these figures that over 500 thousand Syrian babies were born in Turkey. As to the distribution of gender, Syrian Population consists of 1,929,987 men (54%) and 1,653,597 women (46%).[38]

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[36] DGMM Temporary Protection Statistics.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.

Table 3. Syrian Population by Age and Gender

AGE	MALE	WOMEN	TOTAL	
TOTAL	**1.929.987**	**1.653.597**	**3,583,584**	
0-4	255.019	245.931	500.950	**500.950**
5-9	281.897	258.667	540.031	**924.033**
10-14	202.156	181.996	384.002	
15-18	139.657	116.100	255.231	**255.231**
19-24	283.636	210.764	494.400	
25-29	199.978	145.682	345.660	
30-34	157.403	114.233	271.636	
35-39	117.513	95.599	213.112	
40-44	84.006	74.677	158.683	**1.828.843**
45-49	59.139	56.316	115.455	
50-54	49.302	48.406	97.708	
55-59	37.542	37.569	75.111	
60-64	28.148	29.039	57.187	
65-69	20.206	20.577	40.783	
70-74	7.697	8.646	16.343	**74.775**
75+	7.684	9.965	17.649	

From the very first day, the Turkish Government has treated the Syrians as guests and provided humanitarian assistance. Afterwards a temporary status by the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) No.6458 dated 02.02.2013 and Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR) issued on 22 October 2014 with no: 29153 then implemented on 17 March 2016 with no: 29656 within the framework of Article 91 of the LFIP. The status by itself has some problems such as no establishment of an end date and no definition of the right to change international protection status. Temporary status is not a solution for long stays because the uncertain future for both communities causes considerable anxiety. A total of 18,850,943 students receive formal education in Turkey. The addition of more than 1,250,000 Syrians to the education system causes capacity shortages. Similarly adding Syrians to health services such as primary preventive, diagnostic/therapeutic health services, treatment, immunization, combating infectious diseases/epidemics, tuberculosis and providing environmental health to women and reproductive health, child and adolescent health services, troubles the system beyond the scope of the health system's design. Consider too, the additional doctors, nurses and health personnel, the medicine and medical equipment. The job market is also strained. Even though there exists a "Regulation on Work Permits of

Foreigners under Temporary Protection" no. 29594 issued by the Government on 15.01.2016, Syrians' labor market access is conditional. Work permit applications are made by employers to employ foreigners under temporary protection for at least six months, only if the number of foreign employees does not exceed 10% of the number of Turkish workers. Permission is allowed for a maximum of one year at a time According to the official numbers, only 62,400 permits were given, but over a million workers are unregistered. Social security, accommodation and housing for Syrians are inadequate or unworthy. Social welfare is lacking. Unaccompanied minors are another problem. Besides from time to time, tensions rise between the two communities. The Covid pandemic exacerbates the tension since it creates a difficult environment to access necessities of daily life.

Another problematic area is that the international community, including the EU, only accepted about 45,000 Syrians since the beginning. Note that the EU only aids with six million Euros but does not physically accept Syrians. All these effects, plus the securitization of migrants (explained above), determine the Turkish perception of security.

2. Method

One of the frequently used data collection techniques in social sciences is a questionnaire. 'Societal Security Perceptions Questionnaire' was conceived as a method to measure the perceptions of Turkish citizens about Syrian refugees living in Turkey. According to the problem definition, appropriate grounded theory with induction techniques are used and a questionnaire has been built by making a comparison with EU Societal Security Network's seven dimensions (physical security, political security, socio-economic security, cultural security, environmental security, cyber security, radical uncertainty threats).[39] A valid Questionnaire consisting of three factors and 35 questions is used.[40]

The difficulty of the implementation of this survey throughout the country and the fact that there are a large number of Syrians in some cities,

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[39] EU Societal Security Network (SOURCE), "Societal Security", http://www.societalsecurity.net/, (Accessed: 03 May 2020).

[40] Hakan Ömer Tunca & Ahmet Karadağ, "Suriye'den Türkiye'ye Göç: Tehditler ve Fırsatlar", *Kara Harp Okulu Bilim Dergisi*, Aralık 2018, Cilt 28, Sayı 2, 47-68.

but almost none in some cities, are the main concerns related to the decision regarding the sample to be taken from the universe. In accordance with the main subject of this article, which is to measure perception, the scale application to both, a city with many Syrians and a city with almost no Syrians, is considered to be suitable because it will provide an opportunity to compare the perception in the society. The design, which is called the Most Similar System Design (MSSD) in the literature, is based on the principle that the systems that are similar to each other as much as possible will be used in the most appropriate examples. This design in social sciences focuses on the similarities and differences between the systems.[41] For this paper, a systematic approach is applied to find the suitable places for the design which provides candidate cities.

The Ministry of Development in Turkey performs an investigation of socio-economic indicators of the country to make social and cultural progress, increase the quality of human resources, develop environmental awareness, and raise individual prosperity in the context of economic development in a multidimensional and comprehensive manner. In this article, Socio-Economic Development Index-2011[42] was utilised to make the comparison of the cities. Gaziantep and Balıkesir, which are at the same level of socio-economic development (both cities lay in the 3rd level category), have also similar political structures (starting from the 1980's inhabitants tend to support right-wing; local government elections prove this judgement), but on the other hand, Gaziantep holds more Syrian population ratio (22.18%) than Balıkesir (0.39%). These two cities were awarded, a sufficient number of random samples were taken from these cities and a questionnaire was applied.

The analysis of the data was studied with a 95% confidence level. By applying MSSD, the difference between Gaziantep and Balıkesir cities was examined and converted to an average based on the questions in the survey and the averages were compared. This type of comparison assumes

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[41] Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, "The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry," Wiley-Interscience NY, 1970, 31-39.
[42] SEGE-2011, "İllerin ve Bölgelerin Sosyo-Ekonomik Gelişmişlik Sıralaması Araştırması", Ankara, 2013.

the data is normally distributed. Statistical tests were conducted, and the data were found suitable for normal distribution. Independent Samples t Test, one of the variance analyses, was used to compare the averages. Similarly, one-way ANOVA test or F test, which is another variance analysis technique, was used to measure whether multiple independent variables make a difference to the dependent variables.[43,44] The structure of the hypotheses is below:

'H_0: There is no difference between the two sample averages.

H_1: There is a difference between the two sample averages' hypotheses are the null and alternative hypotheses for every question of the survey. Subsequently, 'p' values are examined in independent group t test and one-way ANOVA tables. If $p < 0.05$, the H_0 hypothesis is rejected and there is a significant difference between the data. If $p > 0.05$, the H_0 hypothesis is accepted and there is no significant difference between the data.[45,46] Since the variance homogeneity is not provided for the significant scores obtained as a result of the one-way ANOVA test ($p < 0.05$), Tamhane test, which is one of the multiple comparisons (Post Hoc) techniques, is used. With this test, the direction of the significant differences is revealed in multiple variables.[47]

According to the structure of the hypotheses explained above in this article; a total of 47 hypotheses were tested, four main hypotheses, 35 secondary hypotheses and eight additional hypotheses that enable the comparison of demographic information of the participants. With the first three of the main four hypotheses, the article's main aim of 'Security Perception of Syrian Refugees on Turkish Society'; is revealed for each of the three dimensions (physical security, socio-economic and cultural

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[43] Sait Gürbüz, Faruk Şahin, *Sosyal Bilimlerde Araştırma Yöntemleri*, (3. Baskı), Seçkin Yay., Ankara, 2016, p. 231-257.
[44] Kazım Özdamar, K., *Paket Programlar ile İstatistiksel Veri Analizi* (Çok Değişkenli Analizler), Kaan Kitabevi, Eskişehir.
[45] Andy Field, *Discovering Statistics Using SPSS*, SAGE, London, 2005, s. 425-436.
[46] Nicola Spiers, Brad Manktelow, Michael J. Hewitt, *Practical Statistics Using SPSS*, National Institude for Health Research NHS, England, 2009, s. 30-36.
[47] Yosef Hochberg, Avcit J. Tamhane, *Multiple Comparison Procedures*, John Wiley and Sons Press, NY, 1987, s. 365-375.

security, political security) of the designed and validated questionnaire. The fourth hypothesis is the societal perception, this hypothesis gives us whether there is a difference in perception in Gaziantep and Balıkesir generally. With these four main hypotheses, we can generate and compare the societal security perception of Turkish citizens who frequently interact with Syrian Refugees at every moment of daily life, and who do not interact much.

With 35 secondary hypotheses (that are for each question of the survey), It is revealed whether there is a difference in perception in Gaziantep and Balıkesir for each question. The areas where Turkish society has the highest and lowest perception of security toward Syrian refugees are measured by these hypotheses. With additional eight hypotheses, it is made possible to compare the demographic information of the participants with each dimension of the designed questionnaire and the perception of societal security.

Respectively, demographic data consists of age, education, profession, employment, last job change, time of coming to the city, time of elders' coming to the city are analyzed together with physical security, socio-economic and cultural security, political security dimensions, lastly societal security dimensions. With this analysis, characteristics of individuals and the Turkish society and degrees of perception of security in which perception have been determined. The characteristics of Turkish citizens in areas with the highest and lowest perception of security toward Syrian Refugees have been determined in this way.

3. Survey Implementation and Descriptives

The survey is applied to 400 in Gaziantep and 385 in Balıkesir, 785 people in total. Thus, a minimum number of 384 questionnaires, which must be conducted with 95% reliability for each city, has been reached. 51% of the participants are from Gaziantep and 49% are from Balıkesir. Regarding gender, there is a little less female participation in Gaziantep, so 37.4% of the participants are women and 62.6% are men. Parallel and suitable for the age distribution of the general population in Turkey,[48] the age groups of the respondents are; 20 years old and younger

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[48] Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK), http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?alt_id=1018,

11.5%, 21-30 years old 43.9%, 31-40 years old 23.8%, 41- 50 years old 13% and 51 years old and older 7.8% as shown in Table 4.

Table 4. Participants' Gender and Age Status Histograms

Parallel and suitable to the educational status of the general population in Turkey,[49] the educational status of respondents is; illiterate and literate 1.3%, primary school 15.4%, secondary school 14.4%, high school 23.6%, university 40%, MBA graduate 3.2% and PhD 0.6% as shown in Table 5.

Table 5. Participants' Educational Status Histogram

(Accessed: 22 January 2019).
[49] Ibid.

Participants with 12 different professions participate in the survey, and it is observed that grouping them as government, private, shopkeepers/business owners and other categories could facilitate the interpretation in the analysis. While 65.9% of the respondents stated that they were working, 34.1% not. It should be noted that there are students and retirees among those who do not work. The Figures are in Table 6.

Table 6. Participants' Professions and Employment Status Histogram

Similarly, six different responses are received within the scope of the last job change, and it is grouped like; in the last year 24.3%, 2-5 years 33.6%, over five years and never 42.1%. Figures are shown in Table 7.

Table 7. Participants' Last Job Change Status Histogram

There are five different time frames when the participant or her/his family come to the city where they live. This demographic information is categorized as; born in that city 60 %, coming in the last 1-5 years 10-20 %, coming before five years 15-20%. Figures are below in Table 8.

Table 8. Participants' Self/Elders' Coming to the City Status Histogram

4. Findings

Independent Samples t Tests making binary comparisons and one-way ANOVA tests making multiple comparisons from the parametric tests, since the variance homogeneity is not achieved, Tamhane tests (ad hoc) which measure how the variables that differ significantly are used in the article to measure and compare the perception between Gaziantep and Balıkesir. Respectively, all questions and the findings are in the following tables, Tables 9 through 20.

Table 9. Comparison of Participants' Responses to Physical Security Perception

Question	Balıkesir		Gaziantep		Total		t	p[50]
	Avg	Sd.	Avg	Sd.	Ort.	Sd.		
Battering, fighting, extorting etc. Of Syrian Refugees threaten my personal security with crimes	3,51	1,40	4,58	0,78	4,06	1,25	-13,195	0,000*
Man/child abduction from Syrian Refugees threatens my family's safety	3,45	1,41	4,40	0,86	3,93	1,25	-11,310	0,000*
The arrival of Syrian Refugees increases theft / arson events	3,61	1,28	4,58	0,76	4,10	1,15	-12,832	0,000*
Prostitution increases with the view of Syrian Refugee women as monetary value	3,40	1,38	4,46	0,87	3,94	1,27	-12,837	0,000*
I don't feel safe when I go out because of Syrian Refugees	3,08	1,50	4,11	0,97	3,60	1,36	-11,352	0,000*
I feel terrorist incidents can happen everywhere as Syrians scattered all over the country.	3,58	1,38	4,12	0,95	3,85	1,21	-6,382	0,000*
Syrian Refugees cause an increase in terrorist acts	3,34	1,35	4,08	0,94	3,71	1,22	-8,809	0,000*
Syrian Refugees do not increase crime actions individually or organizationally	2,77	1,42	1,36	0,64	2,05	1,30	17,863	0,000*
Syrian Refugees create uncontrolled population growth	4,33	1,09	4,80	0,63	4,57	0,92	-7,335	0,000*
Diseases not been observed for a long time have emerged after the arrival of Syrian Refugees	3,27	1,43	4,32	0,91	3,81	1,30	-12,168	0,000*
The frequent use of emergency services by Syrian Refugees causes a capacity shortage, making me and my relatives victimized.	3,57	1,41	4,70	0,73	4,15	1,25	-14,103	0,000*

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[50] p<0,05 significant difference, p>0,05 no significant difference. * refers significant difference.

I think epidemic diseases increase with the arrival of Syrian Refugees	3,39	1,45	4,22	0,81	3,81	1,24	-9,723	**0,000★**
The use of schools by Syrian Refugees negatively affects educational services, as they result in insufficient capacity	3,64	1,39	4,48	0,76	4,07	1,19	-10,450	**0,000★**

Table 10. Comparison of participants' responses to socio-economic and cultural security perception

Question	Balıkesir		Gaziantep		Total		t	p
	Avg.	Sd.	Avg.	Sd.	Avg.	Sd.		
The presence of Syrian Refugees contributes to social justice	1,96	1,24	1,53	0,75	1,74	1,04	5,867	**0,000★**
Syrian cheap workers create unfair competition by lowering wages	4,17	1,19	4,89	0,41	4,53	0,95	-11,280	**0,000★**
Syrian Refugees in Turkey increases unemployment	4,15	1,23	4,87	0,48	4,51	0,99	-10,666	**0,000★**
Syrian Refugee children do not earn illegal earnings by begging, unregistered work, theft, etc.	2,35	1,36	3,07	1,37	2,71	1,41	-7,334	**0,000★**
Syrian Refugees cause an increase in fraud / mafia / drug trade	3,49	1,27	4,18	0,90	3,84	1,15	-8,852	**0,000★**
Syrian Refugees in Turkey will contribute to economic growth in the long term	1,84	1,18	2,62	1,45	2,24	1,38	-8,329	**0,000★**
Syrian Refugees' low-level education does not affect the level of education in Turkey	2,23	1,37	1,77	1,12	1,99	1,27	5,080	**0,000★**
The fact that Syrian refugee children do not go to school increases the lack of education.	3,58	1,42	3,99	1,02	3,79	1,25	-4,525	**0,000★**
The family life of the Syrian Refugees, polygamy and gender relations affect the Turkish family life negatively.	3,87	1,34	4,39	0,80	4,13	1,13	-6,582	**0,000★**

Inappropriate behavior of male Syrian Refugees is disturbing women in Turkey	2,36	1,52	1,51	0,70	1,93	1,25	9,896	0,000★
Increase in unregistered marriage / polygamy threatens families in Turkey	4,01	1,29	4,27	0,68	4,14	1,03	-3,414	0,001★
Syrian Refugees have no difficulty in adapting to society	2,29	1,43	1,56	0,77	1,92	1,20	8,953	0,000★
The language used by Syrian Refugees causes Turkish to be distorted	3,38	1,49	4,25	0,76	3,82	1,25	-10,302	0,000★
Syrian Refugees' different sectarian religious beliefs affect Turkey's religious beliefs	2,90	1,48	3,76	1,31	3,34	1,46	-8,618	0,000★
Syrian identity threatens the integrity of resident identity in Turkey	3,79	1,36	4,23	0,68	4,02	1,09	-5,622	0,000★

Table 11. Comparison of Participants' Responses to Political Security Perception Dimension

Question	Balıkesir		Gaziantep		Total		t	p
	Avg.	Sd.	Avg.	Sd.	Avg.	Sd.		
I have no worries about Syrian Refugees in the future could become the majority instead of the minority and claim territory from Turkey	2,29	1,51	3,61	1,69	2,96	1,73	-11,534	0,000★
My trust in the justice mechanism decreases with the thought that the crimes committed by the Syrian Refugees are not punished	3,70	1,38	4,70	0,59	4,21	1,17	-13,037	0,000★
Due to the religion, language, race, sect, ethnicity and political view of Syrians, the unfair behavior of the state causes corruption.	3,62	1,37	4,30	0,70	3,96	1,13	-8,718	0,000★
Disagreements between Syrian Refugees and Turks may cause civil war	3,94	1,31	4,42	0,68	4,18	1,07	-6,365	0,000★

The presence of Syrian Refugees does not cause any future anxiety for me	2,31	1,43	1,32	0,59	1,80	1,19	12,529	**0,000***
Collective citizenship of Syrian Refugees affects political balances	4,23	1,20	4,38	0,66	4,31	0,97	-2,095	**0,037***
Syrians threaten the unitary structure with discourses of gaining independence within the country for the future	3,77	1,40	4,40	0,70	4,09	1,15	-7,933	**0,000***

In almost all questions on physical security, socio-economic and cultural security, political security perception dimensions; Gaziantep participants stated that they perceive Syrians as a higher threat than those in Balıkesir. Only two questions in the Socio-Economic and Cultural Perception dimension 'Syrian Refugee children do not earn illegal earnings by begging, unregistered work, theft, etc.' (2,35 vs 3,07) and 'Syrian Refugees in Turkey will contribute to economic growth in the long term' (1,84 vs 2,62) and 1 question in Political Perceptions dimension 'I have no worries about Syrian Refugees in the future could become majority instead of minority and claim territory from Turkey' (2,29 vs 3,61) showed Balıkesir is more concerned than Gaziantep.

Table 12. Comparison of Participants' Responses to Societal Security Perception

City	Balıkesir		Gaziantep		t	p
	Avg.	Sd.	Avg.	Sd.		
Physical Security Perception	3,51	1,03	4,40	0,46	-15,546	**0,000***
Socio-Economic and Cultural Security Perception	3,73	0,79	4,35	0,37	-14,124	**0,000***
Political Security Perception	3,83	0,97	4,48	0,42	-12,180	**0,000***
Societal Security Perception	3,66	0,82	4,40	0,36	-16,251	**0,000***

There is a statistically significant difference between the participants in different cities in terms of physical security, socio-economic and cultural security, political security and societal security perception ($p < 0.05$). Societal Security Perception of those living in Gaziantep is higher (4,40).

**Table 13. 'Gender' Comparison of Participants' Responses
to Societal Security Perception**

Gender	Women		Man		t	p
	Avg.	Sd.	Avg.	Sd.		
Physical Security Perception	3,88	1,00	4,02	0,84	-2,058	**0,040***
Socio-Economic and Cultural Security Perception	3,99	0,71	4,08	0,67	-1,598	**0,111**
Political Security Perception	4,13	0,85	4,18	0,78	-0,815	**0,415**
Societal Security Perception	3,97	0,77	4,08	0,70	-1,825	**0,069**

There is a statistically significant difference between the participants of different genders in terms of physical security perception ($p < 0.05$). Levels of socio-economic and cultural security, political security and societal security perception do not change according to gender.

**Table 14. 'Age' Comparison of Participants' Responses
to Societal Security Perception**

Age	20 years old and younger		21-30 years old		31-40 years old		41-50 years old		51 years old and older		F	p
	Avg.	Sd.	Avg.	Sd.	Avg.	Sd.	Avg.	Sd.	Avg.	Sd.		
Physical Security Perception	3,84	1,05	3,94	0,89	4,04	0,85	3,97	0,90	4,10	0,98	1,224	**0,299**
Socio-Economic and Cultural Security Perception	3,98	0,74	4,03	0,70	4,06	0,64	4,07	0,68	4,18	0,67	0,933	**0,444**
Political Security Perception	4,11	0,83	4,16	0,79	4,18	0,75	4,14	0,93	4,19	0,88	0,144	**0,966**
Societal Security Perception	3,95	0,81	4,02	0,71	4,08	0,68	4,05	0,75	4,15	0,78	0,910	**0,458**

There is no statistically significant difference between the participants of different ages in terms of physical security, socio-economic and cultural security, political security and societal security perception (p> 0.05). Levels of physical security, socio-economic and cultural security, political security and societal security perception do not change according to age.

Table 15. 'Education' Comparison of Participants' Responses to Societal Security Perception

Education	1 [51]		2 [52]		3 [53]		4 [54]		5 [55]		6 [56]		F	p	Significant difference
	Avg.	Sd.	Avg.	Sd.	Avg.	Sd.	Avg.	Sd.	Avg.	Sd.	Avg.	Sd.			
Physical Security Perception	4,25	1,16	4,30	0,57	4,36	0,53	4,21	0,73	3,60	0,98	3,37	1,25	27,231	0,000 ★	6-1,2,3,4 5-1,2,3,4
Socio-Economic and Cultural Security Perception	4,18	0,78	4,28	0,47	4,33	0,40	4,14	0,66	3,83	0,74	3,68	0,93	17,044	0,000 ★	6-1,2,3 5-1,2,3,4
Political Security Perception	3,92	1,07	4,40	0,54	4,42	0,51	4,32	0,72	3,95	0,89	3,58	1,14	14,859	0,000 ★	6-2,3,4 5-2,3,4
Societal Security Perception	4,15	0,88	4,31	0,47	4,36	0,42	4,21	0,64	3,76	0,77	3,54	1,02	25,220	0,000 ★	6-1,2,3,4 5-1,2,3,4

There is a statistically significant difference between the participants with different educational backgrounds in terms of physical security, socio-economic and cultural security, political security and societal security

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[51] Illiterate and literate.
[52] Primary school.
[53] Secondary school.
[54] High school.
[55] University.
[56] Postgraduate, PhD.

perception (p <0.05). While the perception of societal security is the highest among those who have graduated from secondary school (4.36), MBA graduates and PhD are the lowest (3.76 and 3.54). The direction of the significance is; illiterate and literate, primary school, secondary school, high school and university graduates' Societal Security Perception is higher than MBA graduates and PhD.

Table 16. 'Profession' Comparison of Participants' Responses to Societal Security Perception

Profession	government		private		Shopkeepers / business owners		others		F	p	Significant difference
	Avg.	Sd.	Avg.	Sd.	Avg.	Sd.	Avg.	Sd.			
Physical Security Perception	3,73	1,03	4,31	0,57	4,22	0,61	3,38	1,01	46,981	0,000★	1-2,3 4-2,3
Socio-Economic and Cultural Security Perception	3,88	0,74	4,22	0,56	4,20	0,51	3,75	0,79	21,514	0,000★	1-2,3,4 4-2,3
Political Security Perception	3,86	0,92	4,33	0,67	4,39	0,54	3,95	0,93	18,692	0,000★	1-2,3,4 4-2,3
Societal Security Perception	3,82	0,81	4,28	0,52	4,25	0,49	3,65	0,83	36,985	0,000★	1-2,3,4 4-2,3

There is a statistically significant difference between the participants with different professions in terms of physical security, socio-economic and cultural security, political security and societal security perception (p <0.05). While the perception of societal security is the highest among those who work privately (4.28), government and other workers are the lowest (3.82 and 3.65).

Table 17. 'Employment' Comparison of Participants' Responses to Societal Security Perception

Employment	Job		No job		t	p
	Avg.	Sd.	Avg.	Sd.		
Physical Security Perception	4,09	0,81	3,72	1,04	5,065	**0,000★**
Socio-Economic and Cultural Security Perception	4,10	0,65	3,95	0,74	2,640	**0,009★**
Political Security Perception	4,21	0,78	4,05	0,86	2,532	**0,012★**
Societal Security Perception	4,12	0,66	3,88	0,82	4,078	**0,000★**

There is a statistically significant difference between the participants with different employment statuses in terms of physical security, socio-economic and cultural security, political security and societal security perception (p <0.05). Societal Security Perception of those who have a job is higher (4,12).

Table 18. 'Last Job Change' Comparison of Participants' Responses to Societal Security Perception

Last Job Change	in the last 1 year		2-5 years ago		over 5 years and never		F	p	Significant difference
	Avg.	Sd.	Avg.	Sd.	Avg.	Sd.			
Physical Security Perception	3,84	0,93	4,12	0,74	4,09	0,91	5,929	**0,003★**	1-2,3 2-3
Socio-Economic and Cultural Security Perception	3,97	0,72	4,10	0,63	4,14	0,69	3,593	**0,028★**	1-3
Political Security Perception	4,14	0,82	4,16	0,74	4,25	0,81	1,437	**0,238**	
Societal Security Perception	3,95	0,74	4,12	0,63	4,14	0,74	4,312	**0,014★**	1-3

There is a statistically significant difference between the participants with having job change in terms of physical security, socio-economic and cultural security and societal security perception (p <0.05). There is no statistically significant difference in terms of political security perception (p> 0.05). While the perception of societal security is the highest among

those who change their job a very long time ago (4.14) and 2-5 years ago (4,12), those who changed their job in the last year are the lowest (3.95).

Table 19. 'Time of Coming to City' Comparison of Participants' Responses to Societal Security Perception

Time of Coming to City	born		in the last 1-5 years		before 5 years		F	p	Significant difference
	Avg.	Sd.	Avg.	Sd.	Avg.	Sd.			
Physical Security Perception	4,15	0,74	3,49	1,05	3,84	1,01	36,991	0,000★	1-2,3 2-3
Socio-Economic and Cultural Security Perception	4,17	0,56	3,70	0,83	3,99	0,76	30,575	0,000★	1-2,3 2-3
Political Security Perception	4,29	0,66	3,83	0,98	4,06	0,95	21,928	0,000★	1-2,3
Societal Security Perception	4,19	0,58	3,64	0,84	3,94	0,84	38,799	0,000★	1-2,3 2-3

There is a statistically significant difference between the participants with different times of coming to the city in terms of physical security, socio-economic and cultural security, political security and societal security perception (p <0.05). While the perception of societal security is the highest among those who were born in the city (4.19), those who came to the city 1-5 years ago are the lowest (3.64).

Table 20. 'Time of Elders' Coming to City' Comparison of Participants' Responses to Societal Security Perception

Time of Elders' Coming to City	born		in the last 1-5 years		before 5 years		F	p	Significant difference
	Avg.	Sd.	Avg.	Sd.	Avg.	Sd.			
Physical Security Perception	4,09	0,79	3,33	1,06	4,07	0,93	24,055	0,000★	2-1,3
Socio-Economic and Cultural Security Perception	4,14	0,58	3,46	0,80	4,14	0,71	35,027	0,000★	2-1,3
Political Security Perception	4,24	0,69	3,65	0,89	4,26	0,87	19,221	0,000★	2-1,3
Societal Security Perception	4,14	0,61	3,45	0,82	4,14	0,76	32,629	0,000★	2-1,3

There is a statistically significant difference between the participants with different times of elders coming to the city in terms of physical security, socio-economic and cultural security, political security and societal security perception (p <0.05). While the perception of societal security is the highest among those whose elders were born in the city (4.14), those whose elders came to the city 1-5 years ago are the lowest (3.45).

Conclusion and Discussion

With the 'Security Perception of Syrian Refugees on Turkish Society' questionnaire, one of the effects of Syrian Refugees on the Turkish Society measured perception consists of physical security, socio-economic and cultural security, political security and societal security dimensions. The survey produced sufficient and significant results with its reliability and validity. The findings showed that there is a high threat perception against Syrians proving migration is accepted as a security matter parallel to the Copenhagen theory of securitisation.

All participants living in both cities had a high level of perception of societal security toward Syrians. Their thoughts were; increasing crime rates, creating uncontrolled population growth, causing corruption, lowering wages, increasing the number of unemployment, creating future anxiety, changing political balances and causing probable civil war in the future. What makes peoples' perceptions like this can be listed as politicians' speeches, media with negative news, cost of living, low wages, unemployment rates, Turkish Lira depreciation, the lack of capacity in the schools and hospitals etc.

While Gaziantep participants, who have physical contact, relationship and communication with Syrian refugees at every moment of life, have a higher level of concerns about the perception of security in almost all dimensions, Balıkesir participants, whose contact is less than Gaziantep, have less level of concerns except for some political concerns. Daily life interactions between Syrians and inhabitants and the accepted cultural behaviours of immigrants show that negative relations build high-security perceptions. Rent and food prices, which have increased relatively more than in Balıkesir province, the demand of Syrians to work cheaper than Turkish citizens, the difficulties experienced in settling in Gaziantep, their concentration in certain neighborhoods and regions, the opening of

many workplaces at the same places, the increase in their visibility by spending time outside their home in public spaces such as parks and public transport especially in the spring and summer months, clothing, lifestyle, their habit of speaking out loud, the transformation of the life cycle in Gaziantep, and finally, the different cultural backgrounds of the two communities and their built-in prejudices have caused the majority of Turkish citizens living in Gaziantep to perceive Syrians as a threat in terms of security.

Balıkesir participants had a higher level of security concerns than Gaziantep in the areas, which all are political dimension, children's illegal earnings, no contribution to economic growth and becoming majority. The participants who had MBA and PhD education felt Syrians less threatening to themselves compared to the participants with high school and lower education levels. The less people are educated, the more they get security concerns. The more education and the economic wealth of the people are, the more they tend to consider future challenges the country may face. The higher graduation level of Balıkesir participants, more retired inhabitants and longer use of the media during the day, and therefore encountering negative elements in the media towards Syrians increase their perceptions of threat, especially in terms of future political and economic factors.

Young and old participants, as well as female and male participants, had a similar perception of security within these cities. The guaranteed salary jobs were less anxious than the private sector considering that Syrians could not pose a threat to their business and money.

Employees had a significantly higher level of security perception than those who did not work with the idea that they might probably lose their jobs. Those who changed jobs long ago saw Syrians as a threat to themselves as compared to those who changed jobs recently. Perception of security increased as the residence time in that city increased. Similarly, there is a higher level of anxiety in the participants whose family elders came to the city a long time ago.

Hakan Ömer TUNCA

Özet

Doğal kaynakların dengesiz dağılımı, iklim değişikliği gibi doğal nedenler, silahlı çatışmalar, işgaller, ayrımcılık, insan hakları ihlalleri, teknolojik gelişmeler, daha iyi bir yaşam talebi ve arzusu gibi insan kaynaklı nedenlerle birleştiğinde insanoğlu zorunlu, düzenli ve düzensiz göçe maruz kalmıştır. Birleşmiş Milletler örgütünün resmî raporlarına göre son yıllarda özellikle dünyanın bazı bölgelerinde yaşanan silahlı çatışmalar ve insan hakları ihlallerinin ülkelerin kamu düzenini bozması nedeniyle insanların zorunlu göçü artmış ve 2020 yılında 82 milyonun üzerinde insanın yer değiştirmesine sebep olmuştur. Sözü edilen olayların gerçekleştiği alanlardan önde geleni Suriye devletidir. Arap Baharı sonrası uluslararası aktörlerin de katkısıyla Suriye'de oluşan iç savaş, Suriye Vatandaşlarını 2011 yılı başlarından itibaren Orta Doğu'da yerlerinden ederek yedi milyon insanın yurt içinde ve diğer bir yedi milyonun da ülke dışına göçüne sebep olmuştur. Aynı raporlara göre son beş yıldır en fazla Suriyeliye ev sahipliği yapan ülke Türkiye'dir. Türkiye'nin her şehrine dağılmış 3,5 milyonu aşkın Suriyelinin kitlesel göçü, Türk toplumunu sosyal, ekonomik, siyasi ve güvenlik olmak üzere birçok alanda geniş bir perspektiften iyi ya da kötü etkilemiştir. 2015 yılından sonra Türkiye'de çeşitli illerde yaşanan bombalı terör saldırıları, hırsızlık, dilencilik, organize suçlar başta olmak üzere meydana gelen asayiş suçlarının artmasıyla toplumda bu olayların yabancılar tarafından yapıldığı kanısı oluşturmaya başlamıştır.

Bu araştırmanın temel amacı, Türkiye'de on yılı aşkın süredir kalan Suriyelilerin kalıcı veya geçici statüleri konusunda süregelen tartışmalar ışığında Türk Vatandaşları üzerinde neden olduğu güvenlik algısını tespit etmektir. Suriyelilere yönelik güvenlik algısı konuya özel yeni geliştirilen bir anket ile ölçülmüştür. Bu anketin ülke genelinde uygulanmasının zorluğu ve bazı illerde çok sayıda Suriyeli bulunurken bazı illerde hemen hemen hiç Suriyeli olmaması evrenden alınacak örneklemin kararına ilişkin temel kısıt olmuştur. Bu kısıtı ortadan kaldırmak amacı ile sosyal bilimlerde sıklıkla kullanılan ve karşılaştırma yapılmasına olanak sağlayan "Benzer Sistemler Tasarımı" kullanılmıştır. Benzer Sistemler Tasarımı mümkün olduğunca birbirine çok benzeyen sistemlerin en uygun örneklerde kullanılması ve değişken bir parametrenin bu sistemler üzerinde denenmesi esasına dayanan bir tasarımdır. Bu araştırmada benzer sosyo-ekonomik parametrelere sahip ancak farklı Suriyeli nüfuslarına sahip iki şehir bu tasarıma uygun olarak

belirlenmiştir. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Kalkınma Bakanlığı tarafından hazırlanan ve kamu uygulamalarına girdi sağlamak amacıyla Türkiye'deki illerinin sosyo-ekonomik gelişmişliklerini nesnel olarak ölçen ve karşılaştıran analiz "İllerin Sosyo-Ekonomik Gelişmişlik Sıralaması Araştırması (SEGE)" şehirlerin seçimi kapsamında kullanılmıştır. Aynı sosyo-ekonomik gelişmişlik düzeyi ile seçilen örnek şehirler Gaziantep ve Balıkesir benzer siyasi yapılara sahip olmakla birlikte sırasıyla %22,18 ve %0,39 Suriyeli barındırmaları ile araştırmaya konu edilmiştir.

Geliştirilen anket, gömülü teori kullanılarak toplumda bu konudaki kavramların toplanması, toplanan kavramların toplumsal güvenlik literatüründe yer alan sütunlarla karşılaştırılması, sosyal bilimlerde bir ölçek için gerekli tüm bilimsel aşamaların uygulanması suretiyle tasarlanmış ve denenmiştir. Fiziksel, sosyo-ekonomik ve Kültürel Güvenlik ile Siyasi Güvenlik isimli üç sütundan oluşan ve 35 soru içeren ölçek şehirlerden yeterli sayıda rastgele örneklem alınarak uygulanmıştır. Uygulama sonucu ölçeğin yeterli ve önemli sonuçlar ürettiği, geçerli ve güvenilir olduğu anlaşılmıştır.

Seçilen her iki şehrin de toplamda Suriyelileri yüksek düzeyde tehdit olarak algıladığı tespit edilirken aynı zamanda şehirler arasında da farklılıklar olduğu gözlenmiştir. Genel tehdit olarak algılanan hususlar: "artan suç oranları, kontrolsüz nüfus artışı yaratmak, yozlaşmaya neden olmak, ücretleri düşürmek, işsiz sayısını artırmak, gelecek kaygısı yaratmak, siyasi dengeleri değiştirmek ve gelecekte olası bir iç savaşa neden olmak" şeklinde tespit edilmiştir. Suriyeli mültecilerle yaşamın her anında fiziksel teması, ilişkisi ve iletişimi olan Gazianteplilerin hemen her güvenlik boyutunda tehdit algılarının Balıkesir'e göre daha yüksek düzeyde olduğu ortaya çıkmıştır. Teması Gaziantep'e göre daha az olan Balıkesir katılımcılarının ise "yasa dışı kazanç sağlanması, uzun dönemde Türkiye'nin ekonomik büyümesine katkı sağlanmayacağı ve gelecekte Türkiye topraklarından hak iddia edilmesi" şeklindeki birkaç siyasi kaygılar dışında kaygılarının daha az olduğu belirlenmiştir.

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